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“A Calculated and Terrible
Efficiency”
The Operation Veritable Fire Plan,
February 1945
D AV I D G R E B S TA D
Abstract : The First Canadian Army’s Operation Veritable, launched in
early February 1945, aimed to drive the Germans from between the Maas
and Rhine Rivers in order to establish the jumping off point for the
Allied assault into the Rhineland. To support this attack, over a thousand
guns were assembled from Canadian and British artilleries to smash
and suppress the German defenders as the Anglo-Canadian manoeuvre
forces advanced. Through innovation, guile and the use of new and more
effective equipment, the gunners in support of First Canadian Army
overcame challenging terrain and a weakened but nonetheless resolute
enemy to enable the largest offensive operation of Canadian arms in the
Second World War with what one Canadian Army historian referred to
as a “calculated and terrible efficiency.”
Note to Readers: For ease of reference, a list of acronyms is provided at the
end of this article (Appendix A).

I

southeast of Nijmegen, Netherlands, the
early morning quiet of 8 February 1945 was shattered by the
unearthly din of the largest artillery bombardment undertaken by
Commonwealth forces since the Battle of El Alamein in 1942. The fire
plan was in support of the First Canadian Army’s drive to clear the
enemy from between the Maas and Rhine Rivers and thus establish
the jumping off point for the Allied crossing of the Rhine. Operation
Veritable, as the assault was known, was the largest undertaking
of Canadian arms during the Second World War; at one point in
n the sodden fields
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the operation 450,000 personnel—Canadians, Britons, Poles and
Dutch—found themselves in the ranks of the First Canadian Army.
Over a thousand guns supported the assault with what a Canadian
Army historian called a “calculated and terrible efficiency.”1
This paper will provide a comprehensive analysis of the Veritable
fire support plan and how that plan enabled the First Canadian Army
to conduct its operation in the face of complex terrain, inclement
weather, plentiful minefields and a determined, albeit sorely depleted,
German Army. More specifically, this paper will demonstrate
how the fire plan enabled First Canadian Army’s success through
overwhelming fire support and innovative tactics that neutralised
hostile batteries and suppressed German defensive positions. After
conducting a brief survey of the strategic situation on the western
front in early 1945, and the events that led to Veritable, this paper
will lay out the manoeuvre plan devised by General (Gen.) Harry
Crerar, commander of First Canadian Army, and Lieutenant-General
(Lt.-Gen.) Brian Horrocks, commander of XXX British Corps, the
lead assault formation. Thereafter, this paper will describe how the
vast artillery organisation was brought together under utmost secrecy
and executed the immense bombardment. Throughout the narrative,
this article will highlight unique aspects of the fire plan, including
the employment of novel equipment such as the 1st Canadian Rocket
Battery, the first Canadian use of the proximity fuse airburst fuse
and innovative tactics such as the employment of a feint smoke screen
and an all-arms ‘pepper pot.’ In so doing, this article will illustrate
how Canadian and Allied gunners enabled the largest operation
undertaken by First Canadian Army during the Second World War.

strategic situation
By December 1944, 21st Army Group under British Field Marshal
Bernard Montgomery was poised to thrust into the Ruhr region,
Germany’s industrial heartland. At a meeting on 6 December,
Montgomery directed Crerar to plan an offensive operation directed
to the southeast of Nijmegen and transferred XXX British Corps to
First Canadian Army. On 16 December, as the Canadian and British
1  
War Diary [hereafter WD], 2nd Canadian Field Historical Section, February 1945,
RG24-C-3, Volume 17507, File 1870, Library and Archives Canada [hereafter LAC].
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staffs were in the midst of their planning, German Field Marshal
Gerd von Rundstedt launched the Ardennes offensive designed to
drive a wedge between the Allied Army Groups and seize the port of
Antwerp. Three days later, Montgomery placed Veritable on hiatus
and transferred XXX British Corps and its subordinate formations
to Second British Army for the Ardennes fight, leaving Crerar with
I British and II Canadian Corps under his command. Elements of
II Canadian Corps, particularly 2nd Canadian Division, were kept
in the line to hold the position that would eventually become the
Veritable start line while I British Corps remained poised northeast
of Nijmegen to block any German incursion from that direction.
When von Rundstedt’s offensive was defeated, Montgomery
directed Crerar to resume Veritable with a target start date of 10
February 1945, a date which was later moved forward to 8 February,
and returned to him XXX British Corps. Montgomery intended First
Canadian Army’s operation to coincide with Operation Grenade, a
converging offensive by the Ninth US Army, who were positioned
further south. Meanwhile, the Second British Army was tasked with
holding the terrain in the middle along the Meuse River.2
The task before Crerar was a significant one. The area of
operations between the Maas and the Rhine epitomised complex
terrain. It was a narrow strip of land of rolling hills and dense forests
with small villages interspersed. Looming large in the middle was
the German national forest, the Reichswald. To make matters worse,
the Germans breached a dike near the Waal River to the north,
flooding the area, a situation that was later exacerbated when rising
temperatures caused snow to melt and rivers to swell.3
First Canadian Army was facing German General Kurt Arthur
Benno Student’s Army Group H. In the area of operations, Student
had the Twenty-Fifth Army in the north nearest First Canadian
Army, while the First Para Army of four divisions was arrayed further
south. The German defences southeast of Nijmegen were deployed
along three lines of defence: a thinly held forward line; a more robust
main line of defence known to the Allies as the Siegfried Line, which

Historical Section, Canadian Military Headquarters, Canadian Military
Headquarters Historical Report No. 155 “Operation ‘Veritable’: The Winter Offensive
between the Maas and the Rhine, 8-25 Feb 45 (Preliminary Report)” [hereafter
CMHQ 155], 16 May 1946, 21-27.
3  
CMHQ 155, 29.
2  
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I British Corps

II Canadian Corps

XXX British Corps

1st Polish Armoured Div

49th West Riding Div

2nd Canadian Div

4th Canadian
Armoured Div

2nd Canadian
Armoured Bde

3rd Canadian Div

4th Commando Bde

18th Canadian Armoured
Car Regiment

43rd Wessex Div

Royal Netherlands Bde
11th Hussars

15th Scottish Div
51st Highland Div
53rd Welsh Div
Guards Armoured Div
6th Guards Armoured Bde
8th Armoured Bde
34th Armoured Bde

Table 1: First Canadian Army order of battle for the initial phase of Veritable.

was supported by eight concrete casements and numerous anti-tank
ditches arrayed in zig-zag style; and a third ‘lay back’ line, also known
as the Hochwald Line, consisting of two lines of trenches supported
by an anti-tank trench in between. In addition, the Germans created
defensive positions between the lines by transforming the intervening
towns and villages into strong points.4 Eight battalions held the
forward line of defence, followed by another five in the reserve
positions near the lay back line.5

the manoeuvre plan
First Canadian Army consisted of three corps—two British and
one Canadian—the whole consisting of three armoured and seven
infantry divisions, plus several independent infantry and armoured
brigades.
Crerar envisioned the assault taking place in three phases. Thirty
British Corps was designated to be the tip of the spear for the first
phase of clearing the Reichswald and securing a line between Gennep
and Cleve. Thereafter, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions would revert
CMHQ 155, 18-19.
CMHQ 155, 19-20.

4  
5  
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to II Canadian Corps under the command of Lt.-Gen. Guy Simonds
and the two corps would breach the enemy’s second defensive line
southeast of the Reichswald along the line Weeze—Cleve. Finally,
maintaining a two-corps frontage, the Army would break through the
final German defences and secure a line between Geldern—Xanten.
Throughout the whole operation, I British Corps would maintain the
charade that they intended to move north-westerly towards Utrecht
in order to keep the Germans from dispatching reinforcements from
this area to blunt the main attack.6
For the initial stages of the attack, Horrocks had under his
command a massive Anglo-Canadian assault force. On the southern
flank, with its right shoulder pressed up against the Maas River, the
51st Highland Division was tasked to open up the route from Mook
through Gennep and Hekkens to the town of Goch. To its left,
the 53rd Welsh Division would capture Brandenburg and clear the
high ground running through the northern part of the Reichswald,
thereafter capturing the high ground around Stoppelberg. Further
north, the 15th Scottish Division had the priority tasks of capturing
the high ground around Kranenburg and then breaching the German
Siegfried defences north of the Reichswald, particularly the key
terrain of the Nutterdern feature followed by the Matterborn feature
from which observation of the area southeast of the Reichswald
could be gained. To the left of the Scots, the men of 2nd and
3rd Canadian Divisions were assigned the ground north of the
Nijmegen—Cleve road and south of the Rhine with the unenviable
task of opening the roads and protecting the left flank of 15th
Scottish Division. This was particularly challenging for the men of
the 3rd Canadian Division who were relegated the inundated low
ground of the Army’s northern flank.
Four divisions, 51st Highland, 53rd Welsh, 15th Scottish and 2nd
Canadian, were scheduled to cross the line of departure at H-hour,
1030 hrs, while 3rd Canadian Division planned to move out seven
hours later at 1730 hrs. In reserve were 43rd Wessex Division and
Guards Armoured Division. Horrocks intended the former to pass
through 15th Scottish and capture Goch, while the latter was meant
to follow their Welsh confreres forward and then advance southeast.
Horrocks knew this would be tricky. He recognised almost
immediately that he would have to smash through the German
CMHQ 155, 14.

6  
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Image 1: Operation Veritable. [CMHQ Report 155]

defences with sheer brute force rather than deft manoeuvre. The use
of artillery, he concluded, was an absolute necessity.
Fortunately, there was plenty of artillery. The senior gunner in
the First Canadian Army, the Brigadier Royal Artillery (BRA), was
Brigadier (Brig.) Edward Chester Plow. Plow had at his disposal a
total of 938 field, medium, heavy and super-heavy guns augmented
with 96 heavy anti-aircraft guns employed in a ground role. Although
Plow, as the BRA, held overall responsibility for the Army Fire Plan,
as XXX British Corps was the assault formation for the first phase
of the operation, he delegated most of his duties to the Commander
Corps Royal Artillery (CCRA) in XXX British Corps, Brig. Stuart
Blundell Rawlins.
The majority of the fire support was found in the divisional
artilleries. By the time of Veritable, Commonwealth artillery doctrine
stipulated that every division had as part of its organisation a
Divisional Artillery (DA), known as a Canadian Divisional Artillery
(CDA) in the Canadian Army, under command of the Commander
Royal Artillery (CRA), an artillery officer with the rank of brigadier.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol30/iss1/6
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Field Regiment

Field Regiment

Field Regiment

24 x 25-pounder
howitzers
(3 batteries of 8 guns)

24 x 25-pounder
howitzers
(3 batteries of 8 guns)

24 x 25-pounder
howitzers
(3 batteries of 8 guns)

Anti-Tank Regiment

Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment

4 x Anti-Tank Batteries

3 x Light Anti-Aircraft Batteries

7

Table 2: Organisation of a Divisional Artillery/Canadian Divisional Artillery during Veritable.

A divisional artillery consisted of three regiments of field artillery,
each with three batteries of eight 25-pounder howitzers, as well as
anti-tank and anti-aircraft regiments.
In addition to the divisional artilleries, each CRA was allocated
extra field or medium regiments to bolster his firepower. As shown
in Table 4 below, the medium regiments in support of the divisions
had been allocated from the Army Groups, Royal Artillery (AGRA)
that were attached to First Canadian Army. An AGRA typically
consisted of one heavy regiment of 7.2- or 8-inch howitzers or 155mm guns, three medium regiments of 4.5- or 5.5-inch guns and one
or two regiments of 25-pounders. In the Corps artillery, Rawlins had,
in addition to the divisional artilleries, five AGRAs: 3rd, 4th, 5th and
9th British AGRAs as well as 2nd Canadian AGRA.
The command relationship is important. The superior formation
for which an artillery organisation was “under command” was
responsible for the administration and deployment of the unit,
whereas those organisations designated as “in support” provided
fire support to the superior formation but their deployment and
sustainment were the responsibility of another organisation, usually
a higher artillery formation.
First Canadian Army also had the support of a novel Canadian
organisation, the 1st Canadian Rocket Battery. Under the leadership
of Gen. Crerar and several British staff officers with an interest in
developing rocket ordnance, a Land Service Mattress Party, as the
equipment was named, was created at the Canadian School of Artillery
in England to develop the tactics, techniques and procedures for the
use of rocket artillery. They began their work in September 1944 and
at the end of the month brought their equipment to mainland Europe
where 112th Battery of the 6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2021
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AGRA Headquarters
3rd Canadian Medium
Regiment

4th Canadian Medium
Regiment

7th Canadian Medium
Regiment

16 x 4.5-inch guns
(2 batteries of 8 guns)

16 x 5.5-inch guns
(2 batteries of 8 guns)

16 x 5.5-inch guns
(2 batteries of 8 guns)

10th Medium Regiment, RA

1st Heavy Regiment, RA

16 x 5.5-inch guns
(2 batteries of 8 guns)

16 x 155mm guns
(4 batteries of 4 guns)

Table 3: Organisation of 2nd Canadian AGRA during Operation Veritable.

was transformed into a rocket battery to refine rocket doctrine. The
battery consisted of twelve “projectors” which were two-wheel trailers
mounting 32 light-gauge tubes. Each tube fired a three-inch rocket
with a 29-pound high explosive warhead to ranges between 4,000
and 8,000 yards.7 The rockets were fired using a ripple effect with a
quarter second between launches so that the rockets did not hit each
other in flight. In one salvo, the twelve projectors fired an impressive
total of 384 rockets that produced an impact area of approximately
700 square yards.8 The salvos produced “a very concentrated lethal
effect…against [troops] in the open or protected only by light field
works.”9 Due to the lack of splinters produced, the value in the rocket
was principally in its blast and ability to shock troops, thus it was
used primarily on targets just before the arrival of the infantry to
stun the enemy.10
After successful tests, the Rocket Battery proceeded to the
Breskens area and fired two salvoes in support of an assault by No.
4 Commando, Royal Marines. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the
7  
List of BRA 1st Cdn Army Files Received from D Arty, Feb 50 – Memoranda,
“Report on Rocket Demonstration 3 Feb 45,” RG24-G-3-1-a, Volume 10673, File
215C1.2009 (D4), LAC.
8  
G. W. L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: The History of the Royal Regiment
of Canadian Artillery, Volume II 1919-1967 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1972), 377n
9  
List of BRA 1st Cdn Army Files Received from D Arty, Feb 50 – Memoranda,
“Report on Rocket Demonstration 3 Feb 45,” RG24-G-3-1-a, Volume 10673, File
215C1.2009 (D4), LAC.
10  
Headquarters 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery, Royal Canadian Artillery, “CRA
2 Div Report, Op VERITABLE,” 4, RG24-C-3, Volume 14324, File 154, LAC.
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division

under command

9

in support

assault divisions
15th Scottish Divisional Artillery
15th Scottish Div

86th Field Regt (SP), RA

84th Medium Regt, RA

147th Field Regt, RA
51st Highland Div

53rd Welsh Div

51st Highland Divisional Artillery
6th Field Regt, RA
53rd Welsh Divisional Artillery
19th Field Regt (SP), RCA

79th Medium Regt, RA

72nd Medium Regt, RA

2nd Canadian Div

2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery

4th Medium Regt, RCA

3rd Canadian Div

3rd Canadian Divisional Artillery

7th Medium Regt, RCA

reserve divisions
43rd Wessex Div

43rd Wessex Divisional Artillery

121st Medium Regt, RA

Guards Armoured Div

Guards Divisional Artillery

64th Medium Regt, RA

(SP) = Self-propelled. Artillery pieces mounted on armoured chassis.
Table 4: Allocation of artillery units to divisions during Operation Veritable.

unit was hard to assess. The battery fired operationally again in
early November 1944 in support of 1st Polish Armoured Division near
Moerdijk to much better results. Shortly thereafter, British gunners
replaced the men of 112th Battery and later fired in support of 15th
Scottish Division near Venlo in the Ardennes region. Finally, on 23
December, the Canadian Army formed the 1st Canadian Rocket
Battery and fully manned it with Canadian gunners.
In his address to his subordinate commanders, Crerar advised:
In my opinion, there is no more important weapon in the armour
of war than surprise. There are, on occasions, tactical problems for
which the only sensible answer is prolonged fire preparation before the
assault – even though such [fire] nullifies surprise[.]… [Obtain] maximum
surprise by eliminating prolonged preliminary bombardment prior to

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2021
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the initiation of movement, and substituting for it a really overwhelming
fire, from the air, if possible, as well as from the artillery, and the
mortars, as the advance to close with the enemy commences, or is just
about to commence.11

With this direction, a lengthy preliminary bombardment in the vein
of the week-long bombardment of Vimy Ridge in 1917 was out of
the question.
The task fell to Rawlins to devise the fire plan. The CCRA
held his first planning conference with the CRAs and artillery
leadership on 26 January 1945, although three days previous his staff
had distributed “Royal Artillery Planning Notes No. 2” to guide
the artillery planning.12 Rawlins issued the fire plan as “RA XXX
British Corps Operation Instruction No. 32 – Operation Veritable” on
3 February 1945.13
Rawlins laid out three objectives for the fire plan: firstly,
neutralise all known enemy batteries; secondly, destroy all known
headquarters and communications nodes; and finally, suppress the
enemy in the line of advance of the infantry.14 The fire plan consisted
of three elements, the first of which was a five-hour period of artillery
preparation that included a deceptive smoke screen. Preparatory fire,
Rawlins articulated, was intended “to stupefy the enemy defences
prior to H Hr and by the judicious use of smoke on both flanks to
blind the form up and move to the start line from the possible enemy
OPs [Observation Posts].”15 The second element of the fire plan was
a standing barrage of smoke and high explosive of an hour’s duration
designed to allow the infantry to form up on the start line. The

GS Matters - Corresp, messages, memoranda, lectures, reviews, etc, re Op
“Veritable,” d/10 Dec 44/8 May 45, “Address given to Senior Offrs of 1st Cdn Army
by Gen HDG Crerar re Op ‘Veritable,’ d/22 Jan 45,” RG24-G-3-1-a, Volume 10466,
File 212C1.2009 (D80), LAC.
12  
WD, Headquarters, No. 2 Army Group, Royal Canadian Artillery, 23 January
1945, RG24-C-3, Volume 14317, File 1158, LAC.
13  
“RA XXX British Corps Operation Instruction No. 32. Operation VERITABLE,”
3 February 1945, RG24-G-3-1-a, Volume 10467, File 212C1.2009 (D83), LAC.
14  
Brigadier A. L. Pemberton, The Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment
(London: The War Office, 1951), 264.
15  
OPERATIONS - “VERITABLE” - XXX British Corps Planning Notes, “CCRA
Conference,” RG24-G-3-1-a, Volume 10467, File 212C1.2009 (D83), LAC.
11  
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equipment

rounds per gun

25-pounder howitzer

700

4.5/5.5-inch gun

350

7.2-inch howitzer

150

155 mm gun

100

8-inch gun

140

240 mm howitzer

80

11

Table 5: Veritable artillery dumping programme. [Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics

and Equipment, 262]

third and final element of the fire plan was a protective barrage that
supported the attacking forces during their advance.16
In the days prior to the operation, the units destined to join
First Canadian Army were scattered throughout the region anywhere
from 50-100 miles away from Nijmegen. A major logistical effort
was required to assemble them in time and it had to be conducted
in utmost secrecy. In late January, the units were withdrawn from
their areas of operations and concentrated near the town of Louvain
which lay between Antwerp and Boxtel. Starting on 5 February, they
began to move into their assembly areas. To complicate matters, the
weather warmed and turned the formerly ice and snow-bound roads
into quagmires of oozing mud.17
Assembling the massive amounts of ammunition required in the
forward area, without exposing Allied intentions to the Germans,
was particularly challenging. While the deployment of guns into
firing positions could be delayed until the last possible moment, the
sheer scope of the planned ammunition expenditure necessitated a
herculean logistical effort over several weeks to position ammunition
in the allocated gun areas.
Crerar recalled that if the total ammunition allotment for
Veritable, which consisted of 350 different types, were stacked side
by side and five feet high, it would line a road for thirty miles.18 In
order to maintain the deception plan, the artillery ammunition, which
alone totalled 500,000 rounds and weighed a total of 11,000 tons,
had to be brought forward during periods of darkness, over sodden
CMHQ 155, 16.
CMHQ 155, 22.
18  
Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, Volume II, 402.
16  
17  
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and muddy roads, dropped on battery positions, placed in trenches
dug during previous periods of darkness and then camouflaged—
all before sunrise.19 For this, First Canadian Army was indebted to
the efforts of the gunners of 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery who
were not only responsible for receiving and camouflaging their own
ammunition, but they were also responsible for receiving, stacking and
camouflaging the ammunition of 43rd and 53rd Divisional Artilleries
who would later occupy positions in the 2nd Canadian Division area
between D-14 and D-day.20 This was no light work. Captain (Capt.)
George Blackburn, an officer with the 4th Field Regiment, RCA
recalled that trenches for ammunition were approximately 30 cubic
yards in size, requiring the excavation of thirty tons of soil.21 In one
instance that must have been maddening, 400 rounds that had been
dumped near 16 Battery of 12th Field Regiment, RCA were found to
be unserviceable due to flooding in the pits.22
Amongst the ammunition that was dropped at the gun positions
was a new weapon which revolutionised the way that war is
conducted: the proximity fuse. Officially designated Variable Time
or VT so as not to divulge to Germans how it operated and known
colloquially to the gunners as the Peter fuse, the proximity fuse
augmented the stores of mechanical time-fuses as tools to produce
airburst explosions. Hitherto, mechanical time fuses employed an
internal clockwork mechanism designed to detonate the projectile in
the air and shower the target with shell fragments. Unfortunately,
the inherent distribution of fire caused by non-standard conditions
such as air density, charge temperature, wind and the like meant
it was extremely difficult to achieve a consistent detonation at the
optimum height of burst. Proximity fuses, however, housed a radar
emitter in the nose of the fuse that detected and detonated when
the round was at the optimum height, approximately 20-30 feet.23
The results were devastating. The first Allied use of the fuse was

Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, 263.
Headquarters 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery, Royal Canadian Artillery, “CRA
2 Div Report, Op VERITABLE,” 2 RG24-C-3, Volume 14324, File 154, LAC.
21  
George G. Blackburn, The Guns of Victory (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1996), 235.
22  
WD, 12th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, 1 April 1945, RG24-C-3,
Volume 14462, File 705, LAC.
23  
Major G. S. J. Bowell, The History of the Brigadier Royal Artillery Branch of
Headquarters First Canadian Army (Holland: n.p., 1945), 72.
19  
20  
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by the 12th US Artillery Group on 28 December 1944 near St. Vith
and a 1st US Army Field Artillery report recorded that “it is hard
to believe, but the cumulative figures indicate 2,000 enemy dead,
which could be observed and counted…VT ammunition is most
deadly.”24 The historian of the 12th Field Regiment, RCA remarked
that when a target was engaged at “high angle,” which is to say an
initial trajectory of 45 degrees or greater, there would be no sound of
the round flying in the air as it descended toward the target. When
the proximity fuse detonated above the enemy without any warning
whatsoever, it provided “a very disagreeable surprise for the Hun.”25
In the lead-up to Veritable, a number of artillery technicians
visited First Canadian Army to lecture on the use the proximity
fuse. Secrecy was so important as there was concern about rounds
falling into enemy hands, thus the authority to actually use the
fuse was held at a very high level. In fact, CCRA XXX British
Corps directed that VT fuses were not to be fired on D-day between
0830 hrs and 1730 hrs without permission from XXX British Corps
artillery headquarters. Outside this period, CRAs were delegated to
authorise their use.26
The preparation of the artillery positions was also challenging.
The overall reconnaissance and occupation plan fell to Rawlins
whose staff faced the dilemma of finding sufficient gun areas for
the plentiful batteries in a narrow strip of terrain extending six-bytwo miles and consisting of numerous tree plantations and inundated
fields.27 No reconnaissance of gun positions was permitted to occur
earlier than forty-eight hours before the guns were scheduled to arrive
and absolutely no British vehicles were allowed near the front so the
gunners of 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery had to chauffeur their
British colleagues about the battlefield during their visits.28 Starting
2 February, roads were closed to anything but essential traffic and
any vehicle moving at night required the authorisation of no less
Maj.-Gen. J. B. A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 2001), 323 n127.
25  
Capt. T. J. Bell, Into Action with the 12th Field (Ottawa: Queens Printer,
1945), 106.
26  
OPERATIONS - “VERITABLE” - XXX British Corps Planning Notes, RG24-G3-1-a, Volume 10467, File 212C1.2009 (D83), LAC.
27  
Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, Volume II, 403.
28  
Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, Volume II, 403; and R. B. Dale Harris, The Six
Years of 6 Canadian Field Regiment Royal Canadian Artillery, September, 1939 –
September, 1945 (n.p.: Bilthoven, 1945), 88.
24  
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than a brigadier. Consequently, the 6th Field Regiment Headquarters
officers’ dance was ruined “for a lack of girls.”29 Their colleagues in 11
Battery, 12th Field Regiment, RCA were equally chagrined to cancel
a dance for which the services of the band of the Guards Division
had been secured.30 Regardless of when the reconnaissance occurred,
no digging of gun pits or command posts was permitted before D-1.31
By D-3, guns began deploying into the area. Like the ammunition
dumping programme, the occupation of new gun positions occurred
at night. Some of the routes available were mere cart tracks that had
turned soft and muddy. In one instance, the Gun Position Officer of
a heavy battery had to guide each gun to its position individually,
proceeding it on foot along a narrow path, guiding the driver of the
gun tractor by a flashlight with two layers of heavy paper wrapped
around it to dim the light.32
On D-2, 6 February, graphical descriptions of each battery’s
targets and fire tasks, known as traces, were delivered to the batteries
partaking in Veritable. The various command posts thereafter spent
a busy forty-eight hours making the necessary calculations to engage
their assigned targets.33 The war diarist of the 13th Field Regiment,
RCA remarked that when the traces were handed out to the adjutant
and battery command posts they “received quite a shock, this [fire
plan] being the biggest yet.”34
The immense challenge of cobbling together the artillery left
many senior officers nervous. The historian of the BRA Branch
recalled that “the move program was so tight and fraught with the
possibility of errors and lagging schedules that the BRA [Plow], in
a temporary mood of exasperation, jokingly wagered a substantial
number of guilders that all the artillery would not be in position and
ready by H-hour.” Fortunately, by the evening of 7 February, the
whole of the artillery allocated to support First Canadian Army in
Veritable was in place and ready to begin the fire plan—“the staff

Dale Harris, The Six Years, 89.
WD, 12th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, 2 February 1945, RG24-C-3,
Volume 14462, File 705, LAC.
31  
Headquarters 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery, Royal Canadian Artillery, “CRA
2 Div Report, Op VERITABLE,” 2, RG24-C-3, Volume 14324, File 154, LAC.
32  
Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, 403.
33  
Bell, Into Action with the 12th Field, 111.
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WD, 13th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, 7 February 1945, RG24-C-3,
Volume 14466, File 706, LAC.
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heaved a sigh of relief. The BRA smiled.”35 As the BRA and his staff
modestly celebrated, the dull hum of an armada of bombers was
heard overhead.
Up to 1,000 fighters, 100 medium-day and 90 medium-night
bombers and up to 1,000 heavy bombers from Bomber Command,
Second Tactical Air Force and 8th and 9th US Army Air Forces
supported Veritable. In addition, close air support consisted of fiftynine squadrons from 83 and 84 Groups, Royal Air Force. Impromptu
air support was provided by an overhead “cab rank” system in which
a certain number of aircraft were kept circling over friendly lines until
directed to a target by the Forward Control Post, located at XXX
British Corps Headquarters. In the leading divisions, Contact Cars,
which were forward air control parties with radio contact between
aircraft and the infantry, were available to direct the aircraft onto
the target.36
Bombing was scheduled to begin the evening of 7 February
followed by a continuous combination of programmed and impromptu
support from the air. Over eighty targets were provided to the air
forces for engagement during the preliminary bombardment, ranging
in nature from bridges over the Rhine to fortified enemy positions.
The Canadian Military Historical Report on Operation Veritable
described the terrible fury that was to be dispensed from the air in
rather dispassionate terms:
The towns of Cleve and Goch, key points northeast and southeast
of the Reichswald, were to be totally destroyed, as were all buildings
housing enemy troops in Weeze, Udem, Calcar, Kranenburg and several
other smaller places. Numerous bridges railway lines and junctions,
fuel and ammunition dumps, telephone communications and enemy
headquarters were listed with precise instructions as to how they were
to be destroyed, whether by high explosive or by fire.37

Bowell, The History of the Brigadier Royal Artillery Branch, 71.
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37  
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On D+1, concentrated attacks on Geldern, Kempen and Huls were
scheduled to interrupt the movement of the enemy’s reserves.38
The decision to destroy several towns with air bombardment was
not one taken lightly. Horrocks recalled in his memoir that Crerar
approached him one day during the lead-up to the operation and asked
if he wanted Cleve “taken out.” Horrocks related that he knew that
many civilians, including women and children, were still in the city,
however, it was tactically important terrain through which German
reserves would have to pass in order to block the advance of 15th
Scottish Division. He knew that destroying the town would delay the
German reinforcement and give him a tactical advantage. He wrote:
“So I said ‘Yes’ – the most terrible decision I had ever had to take in
my life, and I can assure you that I felt almost physically sick when…I
saw the bombers flying overhead on their deadly mission…After the
war, I used to suffer from nightmares and literally for years these
always concerned Cleve.”39
On the evening of 7 February over 400 heavy bombers dropped
1,875 tons of high explosive on Cleve.40 The war diarist of 13th
Field Regiment remarked that “a good view was had by all from
the regimental position.”41 George Blackburn of 4th Field Regiment,
RCA later wrote that:
the pulsating roar of the first wave is heard passing over on its way to
bomb the first major town in the path of the attack…the southeastern
sky is first lit by flares, then sparkling ack-ack, as great flashes begin
along the horizon. For a time, there is only the sound of the planes
growling overhead, but then comes the ground shuddering string of
crumps you’ve learned to associate with aerial bombing. Cleve is at
least ten miles away, but the violence of the flashing explosions at times
lights up the whole cloudy dome of the sky.42
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As the bombers pounded away at their targets, the gunners of First
Canadian Army kept up the same pattern and scale of harassing fire
against the enemy as they had for the previous several weeks so as
to not alert the Germans to the mass of artillery waiting to fire.43
D-day, 8 February, dawned grey and rainy. At 0500 hrs the fire
plan began. “All hell let loose,” wrote the historian of the 6th Field
Regiment, RCA. “We had seen some pretty big [bombardments] but
this topped them all.”44 Blackburn recalled standing in the battery
position, overawed by the silence until “one faint, distant voice yells,
Fire! And for a split second there’s a rising chorus of urgent voices on
all sides yelling Fire!... the night is overwhelmed by furious, flashing
roaring waves of sound and concussion, rending and tearing the
darkness with monstrous, theatrical effects.”45 Horrocks was perched
in an observation post constructed for him by the Royal Engineers
consisting of a platform halfway up a tree and recalled that “the noise
was unbelievable.”46
Firing continued for the next two and a half hours as the
preliminary bombardment hammered known and suspected German
positions. At precisely 0730 hrs the feint smoke screen began building
across the whole of the Corps front until 0740 hrs when all firing
ceased and an eerie quiet fell over the battlefield. The silence was
broken by 2 Battery, 4th Field Regiment, RCA when a round left
in the breech of a 25-pounder, its barrel glowing red from the heat
of two and a half hours of intense firing, detonated prematurely,
splitting the barrel of the gun. Fortunately, no one was injured.47
As planned, the sound rangers, flash spotters and Forward
Observation Officers waited intently for German guns to engage
defensive fire tasks. A moment should be spared here to discuss
counter-battery fire in support of Veritable. The German artillery,
although much depleted since the invasion of Normandy, still posed
a threat to Allied troops exposed during the advance. Fortunately,
the deception plan employed by the First Canadian Army convinced
the Germans that the attack was not coming from the direction
of Nijmegen, thus the Germans did not reinforce the artillery of
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the 84th Division. Nonetheless, the German 84th Division had 114
howitzers at its disposal.48 It is no surprise, then, that the first
objective of the fire plan was the neutralisation of the German
artillery and mortar threat.
Prior to the beginning of preparatory fire, the counter-battery
programme was the responsibility of the CCRA of II Canadian Corps,
who was tasked to maintain normal counter-battery activity up until
0500 hrs. During this period, only the artillery already deployed as
part of 2nd Canadian Division was authorised to fire in order to
reinforce the deception plan and convince the Germans the attack
would not come from Nijmegen. After 0500 hrs, the Commander of 5
AGRA assumed responsibility for counter-battery work until H-hour,
when counter-battery tasks were decentralised to the commanders
of 2nd Canadian and 5th and 9th AGRAs.49 In the days leading
up to the operation, the First Canadian Army identified forty-five
hostile battery locations. During the preliminary bombardment, a
concentration was scheduled to engage each of the identified German
batteries with an average Allied-to-German gun ratio of 40:1.
Finding the enemy was of course of extreme importance. To
assist with target identification, XXX British Corps was allocated
the support of two Air Observation Post squadrons, 660 and 662.50
Each squadron had sixteen aircraft and nineteen pilot-observers,
organised into three flights each with four sections of a single aircraft
and pilot.51 All of the divisions, less the Guards Armoured Division,
were allocated a “flight” from the squadron.
Counter-mortar fire was equally important. As the force on the
ground, the CRA of 2nd Canadian Division was initially tasked with
the counter-mortar duties for the whole of First Canadian Army up
until H-hour. In his report on Veritable, the CRA of 2nd Canadian
Division recalled that while “the pre-H hour bombardment was
actually ordered by CCRA of XXX British Corps… the bombardment

Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, 263.
“RA XXX British Corps Operation Instruction No. 32. Operation VERITABLE,”
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tables were prepared by [the Counter Mortar Officer]” of 2nd
Canadian Division.52
The 2nd Canadian Division Counter Mortar Officer had at
his disposal twenty observation posts, two radars and two mortar
locators to locate German mortars, as well as the dedicated fire of ten
7.2-inch howitzer batteries of four guns each to engage the mortars
when they were located.53 After H-hour, the responsibility for countermortar fire reverted to the assaulting divisions, each being allocated
the fire from a medium artillery regiment and two 7.2-inch howitzer
batteries.
Unmasking of enemy artillery during the feint smokescreen
proved underwhelming. The artillery staff of 2nd Canadian Division
found that few of the German batteries revealed themselves and
the gunners assumed this was because most had been neutralised
during the preliminary bombardment.54 Indeed, an intelligence report
indicated that between 0515 and 1000 hrs on 8 February, only ten
artillery rounds were fired by the Germans. The overwhelming fire
superiority of the First Canadian Army is reflected in the following
observation by XXX British Corps: “At 0900 hrs a single medium
gun which had been located by Sound Rangers was bombarded by
four Medium [Regiments].”55 In the same report, the XXX British
Corps Counter Battery Officer noted that on the morning of 8
February, five counter-battery neutralisation programmes were fired
involving a total of 1,000 guns and the expenditure of almost 35,000
rounds of ammunition.56 While most German batteries remained
silent, nineteen enemy mortars unadvisedly opened fire during this
lull in the preparatory bombardment. The counter mortar staff easily

Headquarters 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery, Royal Canadian Artillery, “CRA
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located them and twenty-three mortar targets were engaged before
the assaulting waves crossed the start line.57
At 0750 hrs the preliminary bombardment restarted. Following
this, at 0915 hrs, another smoke screen began to build along the left
flank of the infantry to screen them as they moved forward toward
the forming up position just behind the start line. At 0920 hrs a
mixture of high explosive and smoke artillery rounds were fired on
the starting line of the barrage, slowing increasing in intensity. To
this was added the intense all arms fire of the pepper pot.
By the time of Veritable, the use of pepper pots was standard
practice during Allied operations.58 Essentially, a pepper pot was the
use of weapon systems, such as machine guns, tanks and anti-aircraft
guns, to fire indirectly at designated targets using map-calculated
bearing and elevation with the intent of suppressing the enemy with
overwhelming fire and thus interdict reinforcement, ammunition supply
and communication.59 The Veritable pepper pot was programmed to
be fired in the sixty minutes before H-hour “to saturate the enemy
defences on the front and flanks of the attack with fire from all types
of weapons.”60 Major G. S. J. Bowell, author of the BRA Branch’s
history, put it more prosaically when he wrote that the point of the
pepper pot was to “convince the enemy that it would be suicidal to
move or come out above ground.”61 The Commanders of 51st Highland
Division and 2nd Canadian Division coordinated the pepper pot with
their areas of responsibility divided geographically down the centre
of the XXX British Corps area of operations. Both commanders
were allocated all light anti-aircraft and medium machine guns in
their area of responsibility as well as a regiment of tanks from 8th
Armoured Brigade. Commander 2nd Canadian Division also received
two towed anti-tank batteries from XXX British Corps troops.62 The
amount of ammunition allocated to these units was staggering; the
designated units of 2nd Canadian Division alone fired 1,300,000
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rounds of medium machine gun ammunition, 69,000 40-millimetre
shells, 14,000 4.2-inch mortar bombs and 12,000 17-pounder shells.63
The 3rd and 4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA fired over 800
rounds per gun and one battery reported that eleven of their twentyfour barrels were so hot they were bulging.64
At 1000 hrs all preparatory firing ceased and those guns tasked
to fire the supporting barrage began firing for thirty minutes on the
opening line. The opening line of the barrage was situated close to the
forward positions of 2nd Canadian Division. In order to ensure their
safety, on 1 February Division Headquarters directed its brigades to
withdraw their forward troops between 0100 and 0400 hrs on the
morning of 8 February.65 At 1030 hrs the first lift of the barrage
occurred and the assaulting forces moved out.66
The use of a barrage had become de rigueur in British and
Canadian formations during the Normandy campaign, but thereafter
fire plans consisting of timed concentrations or concentrations-oncall were more prevalent.67 Indeed, Veritable was the only largescale barrage undertaken by Imperial arms since the closing of the
Falaise Gap. A barrage was a manner of fire support developed
during the First World War after its first large-scale use by the
British during the Battle of Neuve Chappelle in March 1915. Several
versions eventually emerged: a creeping barrage which, as the name
implies, creeps forward in a series of timed lifts of 100-300 yards; a
standing barrage consisting of a stationary wall of fire to suppress
an objective, obscure enemy observation or interdict enemy counter
attacks; and a box barrage in which artillery fire would form a
three- or four-sided perimeter around a friendly force that was
consolidating on an objective.
When firing a concentration, batteries would concentrate fire on a
single target area. Timed concentrations were concentrations that were
CMHQ 185, 61.
Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, 406.
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engaged in accordance with the fire plan schedule. Concentrationson-call, however, were unscheduled fire missions fired at targets of
opportunity or previously unidentified enemy positions the assaulting
force happened upon during the advance.
When calls for concentrations were made, code names were
employed that clearly indicated the number of guns required to
engage a target and thus expedite the fire mission. Horrocks recalled
the awesome power he had at his disposal, stating:
If I wanted the fire of all the seventy-two 25-pounder field guns of
any division to be concentrated on one target, my Gunner Brigadier
(CCRA) would merely have to get in touch with [CRA] at the division
concerned and ask for an ‘Uncle’ target to be fired. If a target was
sufficiently important to warrant all, or most, of the Corps Artillery
being employed, this was called a ‘Victor’ target; this might involve 216
field guns from three divisions, and perhaps 128 medium and heavy (5.5inch, 7.2-inch and 155-mm calibres) guns of two Army Groups R.A….
In a matter of minutes, therefore, about 400 guns could be brought into
action where I wanted them.68

If a target worthy of engagement at the Corps level was encountered,
the CCRA of XXX British Corps directed that Victor targets could
be answered by all guns within range, with the exception of those
guns that were firing on a guaranteed timed programme, namely
the barrage, or tasked to provide defensive fire. For this reason,
and due to the surplus artillery, batteries were often designated
as being “superimposed” on barrage shoots. Those batteries so
designated still fired on a barrage, but their fire augmented that
of another battery. If an Uncle or Victor target call for fire was
received, those batteries that were designated as “superimposed”
could engage the concentration-on-call without fear of leaving the
barrage without fire support.69
A critical element of the effectiveness of these rapid concentrations
was the employment of survey teams to accurately plot the locations of
batteries, for it was only with an accurate understanding of the firing
unit’s location with respect to the target that accurate trigonometric
calculations could be made to engage the target. Horrocks testified
Horrocks et al., Corps Commander, 177.
Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, 266.
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to the extreme importance of artillery survey in the Imperial armies
when he stated that “the core of the Royal Artillery was the fantastic
accuracy of their Survey Units.”70 Thirty British Corps had in its
order of battle the services of 4th Survey Regiment, RA while II
Canadian Corps had the services of 2nd Canadian Survey Regiment,
RCA. All divisions, including the reserve divisions, were allocated a
detachment from the Survey Regiment.
Each CRA was tasked with producing the fire plan in support
of his particular division. Once each divisional fire plan was
completed, it was passed to the CCRA and his staff to meld
into one Corps-level fire plan.71 Due to the nature of the terrain,
twisting somewhat to the right after the line of departure, the axis
of advance of the four assaulting divisions had to wheel slightly
to the right as well, necessitating a slight wheel to the barrage
which resulted in an irregular shape. See Image 2 for a graphical
representation of the barrage.
Three of the four initial assaulting divisions chose to employ a
barrage to support their advance. The form of these barrages was as
follows: two field regiments fired a mix of high explosive and smoke
rounds, starting on the line of departure seventy minutes before
H-hour in order to provide a protective wall of fire and smoke as the
assaulting infantry and tanks shook out into their assault formations.
At H-hour, three more field regiments and three to four medium
regiments were superimposed in four rows of fire to a depth of 500
yards. Anticipating an infantry rate of advance of about 100 yards
every four minutes—slightly slower than the doctrinal rate of 100
yards every three minutes—the barrage line “lifted,” or advanced,
300 yards every twelve minutes. To signal to the infantry that the
barrage was about to lift, one minute prior to the lift one gun per
troop fired one yellow smoke. The barrage paused 30-60 minutes on
each intermediate objective and 30 minutes on the final objective.
The anticipated duration of the barrage was six and a half hours.72
Noteworthy in Image 2, no barrage lanes were included for 51st
Highland Division. In this particular case, the Divisional Commander,
Major-General (Maj.-Gen.) Thomas G. Rennie, decided against using
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Image 2: Trace of XXX British Corps Barrage. [Headquarters 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery, Royal
Canadian Artillery, “CRA 2 Div Report, Op VERITABLE,” 2, RG24-C-3, Volume 14324, File 154, LAC]

a barrage and instead chose to use a series of timed concentrations.
He felt that the enemy locations in his boundaries had been accurately
located and preferred to have his fire support concentrated on those
locations rather than dispersed in a barrage where they may not fall
on an enemy location at all.73 Any unforeseen enemy targets before
the 51st Highland Division could be addressed by concentrations-oncall fire missions.
Although the gunners of 51st Highland Division decided to use a
timed programme of concentrations instead of a barrage, by the time
of Veritable there was a debate in the Canadian Army about fire plans
devised with the exclusive use of concentrations-on-call. In a series
of doctrinal and tactical notes released by the BRA Branch of First
Canadian Army known as “HQ RCA First Canadian Army Notes,”
a passage in the second edition, published in mid-December 1944,
argued that “[concentrations]-on-call, with no pre-arranged timed
Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, 266.
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programme in addition, are not a satisfactory way of supporting an
[organised] attack.”74 While the anonymous author, doubtless a staff
officer in the BRA branch, admitted there were some undeniable
benefits to employing concentrations-on-call, such as an economy of
ammunition and increased flexibility, he warned they must be used in
addition to a timed programme rather than in lieu of one. He pointed
out that a fire plan solely reliant on concentrations-on-call would get
no fire support at all if communications faltered, that there would be
confusion arising from multiple calls for fire from forward observers
and infantry commanders and there was the distinct possibility of
missions called by infantry commanders falling on friendly troops if
no clearance of fires were conducted. Further, the author lamented
a recent trend away from planned barrages and he urged readers to
employ a mix of on-call and planned fire support, opining: “it is felt
that the barrage has been neglected lately and that if [ammunition]
is in sufficient [supply], it, together with [concentrations]-on-call,
will [supply] the answer to the [tactical] problem, when the enemy
situation is not clearly known.”75
Both methods of fire support had benefits and drawbacks that
the manoeuvre commander and his CRA had to consider. A timed
barrage provided continuous fire support across the assaulting frontage
that hit not only identified enemy positions, but also any positions
that had not as yet been identified. Although this was obviously
beneficial, the extended linear barrage fire was diluted across the
front and many rounds were fired that landed nowhere near the
enemy. Moreover, the time that was required to produce a barrage,
requiring as it did a large number of calculations, meant they were
most effective during deliberate “teed-up” assaults, such as Veritable,
when there was sufficient lead time for battery- and troop-command
posts to complete the technical preparations.
Timed concentrations, however, provided a much heavier weight
of concentrated fire on identified enemy positions at the cost of
the inherent, albeit diluted, suppressive fire on unidentified enemy
positions that was provided by the linear barrage. This drawback
notwithstanding, timed concentrations were easier and faster to
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plan as the targets were less numerous and the dozens of minute
calculations required by the multitudinous lifts of a barrage were not
required. During operations when there was little preparation time, or
when the enemy’s disposition was well known, timed concentrations
provided a much more effective and efficient fire support solution.
Returning now to the assault, as the barrage lifted off the start
line, the three newly arrived British divisions passed through the
depth positions of 2nd Canadian Division and then the four divisions
moved forward simultaneously over a six-mile frontage. The initial
advance of XXX British Corps progressed well, particularly on
the left where there was less resistance from the enemy. The guns
hammered away at their targets unceasingly during the course of
the day and the infantry was able to follow the barrage closely. By
1830 hrs, 2nd Canadian Division had managed to secure its objective
of the town of Wyler and two and a half hour later the Canadian
combat engineers had cleared the routes of mines.76
At 1700 hrs, 3rd Canadian Division began its assault northwards
supported by a barrage from its divisional artillery and assisted by
gunners of 2nd Canadian Division and Corps reinforcing artillery.
Rising waters caused by the spring melt and blown dikes had surged
over the Quer Dam a mile and a half above Wyler, causing the entire
northern flank of First Canadian Army to flood. Third Canadian
Division had to forgo the original plan of following tanks along hard
surfaces and adopted amphibious vehicles much as they had done
during the Scheldt campaign. By midnight of 8/9 February, the five
assaulting divisions had all entered Germany, seized their objectives
and taken over 1,200 prisoners. Resistance had been light; the greatest
obstacle to the XXX British Corps advance had been the poor state
of roads, soggy terrain and the widespread emplacement of mines
by the Germans.77 By 1900 hrs, reconnaissance parties for artillery
regiments that were slated to move forward rolled out of regimental
areas towards their new battery positions.
The 13th Field Regiment, RCA moved during the night of 8/9
February and was happy to report in its war diary that it was the
first Canadian field regiment to deploy on “the sacred soil of the
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‘Third Reich.’”78 Doubtless the men were happy to finally be taking
the war to the Germans, but they found getting into their new
positions was difficult. One troop attempted to pull its guns onto the
position, but the gun tractors got bogged down in the mud before they
could reach the gun platforms, forcing the guns to deploy where they
were. Another troop had to deploy alongside the road, necessitating
them stopping traffic when the guns fired.79 Additionally, many of
their new positions were heavily mined, causing four casualties: two
killed and two wounded. Similarly, when the reconnaissance party
of 3rd Medium Regiment headed out to secure a new gun area, the
reconnaissance vehicle hit a mine en route. Fortunately, no one was
killed, but the Regimental Second in Command “received a crack on
the head.”80
On D+1, 9 February, an intense rain began, exacerbating the
movement challenges for the assaulting divisions and restricting the
use of air support. Although the breaching of the Siegfried Line was
initially planned to occur at 0400 hrs on 9 February, it was delayed
until 2100 hrs.81 Third Canadian Division continued its amphibious
advance while the 15th Scottish Division was able to pierce the
Siegfried Line between Kranenburg and Nutterdern. Fifty-third
Welsh Division made good advances, but its supply route became
unmanageable due to the poor state of the roads, necessitating the
diversion of resupply onto the 15th Scottish Division routes. The
Scots managed approach and enter the Reichswald itself.
The 12th Field Regiment, RCA moved forward on 9 February into
gun positions near the town of Beek. One of its batteries eventually
ended up firing from a gun position situated in several feet of water.
The regimental historian recalled that every time the gun fired, the
barrel recoiled and submerged the breech in water. He remarked that
it was “one way of keeping them cool but it was rather hard on the
number two [who operated the lanyard] if he had no bathing suit!”82
When 12th Field Regiment, RCA moved again several days later, the
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battery command post of 43 Battery had to build a raft and float
their equipment out of the gun position.83
The 14th Field Regiment, RCA also moved on 9 February and
occupied a position in the town of Wyler, recently cleared by the
2nd Canadian Division. The original gun position was situated in
the town of Beek, but as the reconnaissance parties moved out, they
found the town inundated and instead moved to Wyler. Unfortunately,
as with 13th Field Regiment, RCA the area was heavily mined. On
11 February, the 14th Field Regiment, RCA moved once again, this
time to the west of Cleve. On their way forward they passed through
the town of Kranenburg where there was two feet of water over the
road. Arriving in their new position, they were soon surrounded by
water and the regiment could only be resupplied by the amphibious
DUKWs (known as Ducks) and Buffaloes. They received no fresh
rations for three days and mail had to be dropped by aircraft into the
Regimental Headquarters area.84
By 9 February, the Germans realised from where the thrust of
the attack was coming and dispatched reinforcements in the form of
7th Para Division to the area. A grey and cloudy day prevented the
Allies from using air support to their advantage, but D+1 saw the
first Victor target fired by XXX British Corps, which was called for
at 2200 hrs.85 Overnight 9/10 February, 43rd Wessex Division passed
through 15th Scottish Division to continue the advance.
The advance continued slowly on 10 February and fortunately
for the Allies the skies cleared to allow use of air support. Until
this point, most of 2nd Canadian Division was still situated around
Nijmegen. After capturing Wyler on D-day, the Division, and its
artillery, did not play much of a role. The initial advance was so
rapid, the guns in the 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery soon risked
being out of range to support. By 10 February, the war diarist of 4th
Field Regiment, RCA observed that “Op VERITABLE has squeezed
us out so that we are now out of range, an indication that all is going

Bell, Into Action, 117.
G. E. M. Ruffee, The History of the 14 Field Regiment 1940-1945 (Amsterdam:
Wereldbibliotheek, 1945), 45-46.
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quite well.”86 Despite this optimism, it was on this day that German
counter attacks began to manifest in force. A four-day period of
intense counter attacks and slow advances followed as more German
forces came into the area, including 16 Para Regiment of 6th Para
Division and elements of XLVII Panzer Corps. The return of rain
and cloud cover deprived the Allies the use of their overwhelming
air superiority, causing them to rely more and more on the use of
artillery to break up German attacks.
The 7th Medium Regiment, RCA moved forward on 11 February
and the war diarist recorded that 12th Medium Battery had trouble
getting its guns into position due to the muddy terrain. The battery
enlisted the assistance of an armoured bulldozer but still could only
get one gun into position. The other guns were left on the road and
a whole new area was found for the battery the next day.87 On 12
February, as 7th Medium Regiment, RCA moved forward, it found
that the only road available was flooded and only its 60-cwt trucks
could get through. The regiment’s water wagons were cut off, so
the gunners had to drink the plentiful local water after purification.
When the commander of 2nd Canadian AGRA came to visit the
gunners of 7th Medium Regiment, he was floated to their position
on an amphibious ‘Weasel’ vehicle. 88 There are also numerous stories
about Canadian gunners, particularly the forward observers, getting
stranded on “islands” as the waters rose around them. One forward
observer of 7th Medium Regiment, Captain Spencer, was stranded
on an “island” near the town of Milligan. His comrades were not
too worried, however, as a large number of local civilians—the war
diarist made sure to highlight they were attractive German women—
and a large number of barn animals had sought refuge on the island
with him.89
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On 13 February, the German 84th Infantry Division, which had
been mauled by the initial bombardment and Allied assault, was
pulled out of the line for rest. By the morning of 14 February, the
Reichswald was reported clear. The same day, the clouds broke and
the Allied air forces were once again able to influence the battle.
Three days later, war diarist of the 4th Field Regiment observed:
“Activity – limited to following the advancing red lines on the map. If
it keeps on we will probably be evicted from our HQ by Corps, we’re
really that far back.”90
Crerar’s initial plan had been to bring II Canadian Corps into the
battle on 9 February. Although the Phase One objectives had been met
on schedule, the increasing delay caused by German reinforcements
and the worsening road conditions caused him to delay that decision.
Finally, on 14 February, Crerar ordered II Canadian Corps to take
over the left of the Army frontage, taking under command 2nd and
3rd Canadian Divisions effective at noon on 15 February. Second
Canadian Corps felt the sting of the poor lines of communication
as the rising waters and mud forced them and XXX British Corps
to rely on a single supply route, supplemented by ferry service. At
the same time, 52nd Lowland Division came into the line while 53rd
Welsh Division was put in reserve.
One of the final acts of the operation was the 7th Canadian
Brigade’s operation against Moyland Wood. As the fight progressed,
the guns of 12th Field Regiment’s 16 Battery were deployed in
the only dry area they could find, which happened to be only six
hundred yards from the infantry’s front line. One of the gun layers
was wounded by sniping from Germans in the wood line.91 The 7th
Medium Regiment had mobility difficulties on 20 February when
moving forward, once again having to rely on assistance from tanks
and bulldozers to pull the guns into their new position.92
The First Canadian Army’s assault was slowly grinding down.
The horrible road conditions coupled with the influx of German
reinforcements ensured the original objectives of Veritable would not
WD, 4th Field Regiment, RCA, 13 February 1945, RG24-C-3. Volume 14442, Reel
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be achieved. By 19 February this had become obvious to Crerar
and he set his staff to work on a sequel operation, Blockbuster, to
be launched after a brief pause to reorganise and tee up another
deliberate assault. Attacks towards Goch and Weeze continued and,
for all intents and purposes, Veritable ended on 24 February.

conclusion
A total of 5,953 tons of munitions were fired during Veritable,
consisting of 450,997 shells and over two million machine gun
rounds.93 This was truly a massive undertaking and represented, at
that point in the war, the largest fire plan undertaken by Imperial
arms, although it was to be eclipsed several weeks later by the
massive Anglo-American fire plan in support of Operation Plunder,
the crossing of the Rhine River. What did such an outlay of munitions
achieve? What can be learned from this expenditure of rounds?
The Veritable fire plan provides an excellent case study of the
characteristics of predicted artillery fire—fire directed against
targets based solely on trigonometric calculations. Unlike observed
fire, where an observer confirms the fire hits the target, predicted fire
is not adjusted onto the target, thus its accuracy is contingent on the
accuracy of the target location as well as the accuracy of the surveyed
gun position and compensation for non-standard conditions such as
air temperature, air density, wind speed and direction. In the days
after the launch of Veritable, a team of Instructors-in-Gunnery (IGs)
surveyed the battlefield and visited Allied battery locations, verified
the accuracy of survey and meteorological calculations and conducted
a ground check of impact craters on the barrage lanes and identified
hostile battery locations.
In reviewing command post logs, the IGs team identified some
errors in the calculation of firing data by the First Canadian Army
batteries, but they determined these had a minimal influence on
overall accuracy. A far more profound impact on the precision of
the artillery fire was caused by inaccuracy of the meteorological
calculations. These inaccuracies accounted for the Mean Point of
Impact of artillery concentrations landing an average of 250 yards
to the northwest of intended targets, although the worst example of
Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, 262.
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inaccuracy was 700 yards. Consequently, the IGs concluded, only 5.1
per cent of the artillery rounds fired in concentrations landed within a
hundred yards of the intended target.94 Of course, this dispersion was
equally applicable to the concentrations fired as part of the counter
battery programme. A similar result occurred during the barrage.
The IGs determined that some rounds fell short of the line of fire as
much as 200 yards, although the density of impact craters increased
nearer the barrage lines.95
As a result of these inaccuracies, the destructive effect of the
artillery on German men and materiel during Veritable was minor;
only about 2-3 per cent of German casualties resulted from artillery
and of the twenty-eight German guns that were engaged during
counter-battery fire, the IGs determined five were probably hit and
seven were withdrawn.96 Given such meagre results, why then did the
IGs team determine that the Veritable fire plan was “conspicuously
successful”? The answer is that the Veritable fire plan demonstrated
the true value of artillery lay not in its destructive effects as much
as in its morale effects, namely its ability to suppress the enemy and
prevent their movement and retaliatory firing.97
The IGs found that the fire plan density of 650-1,300 field and
medium shells per kilometre was sufficient to cut all line communication
to the German forward area. Additionally, a rate of one-to-two
shells every minute, landing within 200 yards of an enemy position,
suppressed the Germans and kept officers and men in their shelters
while six rounds per minute within the same distance neutralised the
troops altogether.98 The sheer weight of the fire, although not precise,
served to force the enemy to ground and keep him from manning his
defences. Brig. Pemberton noted that:
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His troops, particularly those of the 84th Division, appeared to find the
moral effects of our artillery fire devastating. Suffering from the nervous
strain of the prolonged bombardment, prisoners stated that they had
the impression of being opposed by overwhelming forces which it was
useless to resist…during the barrage it was impossible to send runners
or to move local reserves.99

Perhaps more to the point is the following extract from a German
prisoner recorded in the history of the BRA Branch: “what gets you
down is the unending harassing fire – that’s what makes your nerves
go kaput! You get so you don’t risk going out [of the bunker] to
relieve yourself!”100
Despite the small number of hostile artillery pieces destroyed
by the counter-battery programme, it was nonetheless deemed a
success by the IGs team who noted that very little defensive fire came
from the German guns during the assault. One German prisoner
reported that half of the guns in his unit had been destroyed. And
yet, even when guns were not destroyed, the German gunners were
nonetheless suppressed by the sheer volume of fire and unable to man
their equipment. The XXX British Corps Counter Battery Officer
recorded one instance of guns being overrun by Allied infantry where
the guns were reported as being brand new and appeared to have
been abandoned without having been fired.101 One captured German
gun detachment commander admitted to being unable to fire his gun
during the barrage due to the counter-battery fire and in another case
a gun crew admitted that they sought shelter in a reinforced bunker
until the barrage passed by them and upon emerging to man their
gun found three Allied tanks and supporting infantry occupying their
position.102 Perhaps the blunt assessment provided by the IGs report
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best illustrates the effectiveness of the counter-battery fire: “enemy
artillery fire was not a source of trouble on that day.”103
The most significant finding of the IGs was that the number of
shells fired was more important than the weight of shell fired and
to that end their reports stressed the added value of the pepper
pot in augmenting the fire plan.104 The effectiveness of such a large
expenditure of munitions had a down side, however, leaving the terrain
pockmarked and difficult to manoeuvre over. After the operation, the
commanding officer of the 1st Battalion of the Gordon Highlanders
suggested that the artillery fire was excessive and resulted in too
much mud and destruction that delayed the advance of the infantry.
He recommended that future fire plans should be shorter with the
infantry following close behind.105
Notwithstanding the Gordon Highlanders’ commanding officer’s
observations, what is clear is that the success of the Veritable
operation was due in no small part to the suppressive effects of the
immense artillery fire plan and supporting pepper pot, an effect
which was only achievable with the appropriate number of guns,
ammunition and a robust command and control network to plan and
execute it. What the Veritable fire plan demonstrates is that after
five years of war, the fire support system of the First Canadian Army
had achieved a level of efficiency and effectiveness that allowed it
to literally blast its way through German defences. The number of
guns, the network of communications, the novel weapons and the
sheer amount of munitions available are indicative of five years of
industrial output, technological evolution and doctrinal refinement.
The confluence of these developments outside Nijmegen in February
1945 allowed the gunners of First Canadian Army to execute the
Veritable fire plan with a calculated and terrible efficiency in the face
of adverse weather conditions, complex terrain and a depleted but
nonetheless resilient enemy.
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appendix a: list of acronyms
AGRA
Bde		
BRA
Brig.
Capt.
CCRA
CDA
Cdn
CRA
DA		
Div		
Gen.
HQ		
IG		
Lt.-Gen.
Maj.-Gen.
Op		
RA		
RCA
Regt
SP		
VT		

Army Group, Royal Artillery
Brigade
Brigadier Royal Artillery
Brigadier
Captain
Commander Corps Royal Artillery
Canadian Divisional Artillery
Canadian
Commander Royal Artillery
Divisional Artillery
Division
General
Headquarters
Instructor-in-Gunnery
Lieutenant-General
Major-General
Operation
Royal Artillery
Royal Canadian Artillery
Regiment
Self-propelled
Variable Time
◆

◆

◆

◆
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